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FOREWORD 
Understanding the nature and dimensions of the world food problem and 
the  policies available to alleviate it has been the focal point. of the IIASA Food 
and Agriculture Program since it began in 1977. 
National food systems are highly interdependent, and yet the major policy 
options exist a t  the national level. Therefore, to explore these options, it  is 
necessary both to develop pol.icy models for national economies and to link 
them together by trade and capital transfers. For greater realism the models in 
this scheme are being kept descriptive rather than normative. In the end it  is 
proposed to link models of about twenty-five countries, .which together account 
for nearly 60 per cent of important agricultural attributes such as area,  produc- 
tion, populat.ion, exports, imports, and. so on. 
In the  national policy mod-els, particularly in the linked system of twenty- 
five national. models, a large number of policy p a r a n t e r s  are involved. To 
reduce the dimensionality of these parameters we need to identify structural  
r e1a t ionsh . i~~  anlong these parameters. Werner Gueth in this paper uses a game 
theoretic approach to explore some aspects of the interdependence of policies 
of various agents on international markets. The understanding obtained from 
such explorations will be useful in reducing the number of i.ndependent policy 
parameters that  have to be specified to  use the system of linked models. 
Kirit S .  Parikh 
Program Leader 
Food and Agriculture Program 
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On oligopolistic markets  with dynamic production functions one can often 
observe at tempts toward cooperative agreements to "stabilize" prices. On the  
other hand, it  is a well-known fact that  cartel agreements are  difficult to control, 
especially when the sellers come from different countries. In such a situation 
partial agreements - for instdance, founding a common marketing board - seem 
more likely than detailed cartel agreements. 
In thi.s paper we analyze the economic institution of a common buffer stock 
agency which can shift supply from present to future periods. Although the 
buffer stock agency determines the prices, in.dividua1 production am.ounts a re  
chosen independently by the sellers. We study the case of a price buffer stock 
agency which cannot produce, as well as the situation in w h c h  a major seller 
controls the buffer stock. One interesting result is that  it makes quite an impor- 
tant  difference whether the buffer stock agency is or is not able to produce. 
Loosely speaking one can say that  only when the bufler stock is controlled by a 
producer do the other sellers not have to consider the future effects of present 
supply decisions. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On the so-called world markets for various agricultural products (cocoa, 
coffee, etc.) there seems to be a permanent tendency to form a board (cocoa 
board, coffee board, etc.). Since most of these markets have a rather inelastic 
demand at given prices (i.e., a good harvest will usually diminish total revenues 
on the market), the main purpose of board formation is presumably to  "stabil- 
ize" supply. Sometimes stabilization of supp!y might take the form of disposal; 
i.e., since there is a permanent oversupply on the  market, the  board simply 
tries to withhold supply, perhaps by directing it to another market  (wheat, for 
instance, can be used to feed animals or to produce alcohol) or even by destroy- 
ing the oversupply. Here we do not want to  consider situations in which stabili- 
zation simply has the form of withholding; some strategic aspects of these 
situations could easily be  analyzed within the standard framework of static oli- 
gopoly theory. It will be  assumed instead that  stabilization of supply is always 
done via building up  so-called buffer stocks which allow the sellers to shift 
present supply to later periods. 
The strategic situation on the market certainly depends on the levels of 
stocks built up until the present period; i.e., on the previous decision behavior of 
the sellers. This indicates that  market situations in which stabilization is done 
via stock adjustment should be looked a t  as dynamic games in which players do 
not face a static confict  situation but  rather interact in time. Stabilization of 
supply by stock adjustment can, of course, be done individually or collectively. 
Here it is assumed that  sellers want to have some coordinated way of withhold- 
ing supply. This does not necessarily require that  all o r  some sellers form a car- 
tel assigning quotas to all its members. If the members of such a cartel come 
from countries with different economic backgrounds, it is usually difficult to  
keep the group together. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that  col- 
lective decision behavior is limited to some decentralized form of withholding 
supply via the institution of a buffer stock agency. So one of the countries 
engaged on the market - probably a major seller like Brazil on the coffee and 
cocoa market - may, for instance, run  the only buffer stock; or some of the sell- 
ers may found an independent buffer stock agency in order to  "stabilize the 
market" by shifting supply to future periods. In any case we will restrict our 
attention to situations in which there is just one buffer stock. This will greatly 
simplify the computational problems involved in solving the dynamic game. In 
the terminology of the theory of optimal control this amounts t o  saying that  we 
restrict ourselves to situations with a one-dimensional state space. 
Apart from special situations, solving dynamic games often requires lengthy 
computations. Here we want t o  simplify the computational problem as far as 
possible; i ,e. ,  we will look a t  gam.es which represent the relevant aspects within a 
rather simple framework. In particular, we will not attempt t o  develop one 
model which tries to incorporate all relevant strategic aspects of running a 
buffer stock. 
There is a long tradition in  agricultural economics of discussing optimal 
control of food stocks (see Gard.ner 1969, and the references mentioned there). 
But analysis has always been based on non-strategic situations with just one 
player, the one who controls the buffer stock. So what is new in the present 
work is that  we study the optimal contr.01 of food stocks by using the theory of 
noncooperative dynamic games. 
In the following we will first analyze the problem in a deterministic frame- 
work, which means that  the only uncertainty which the  players have to  face is 
that they do not know what their opponents a re  going to do. Player I runs the 
buffer stock, which may or may not be able to  produce. Players 2, ..., n (22) are 
pure producers. Since we want mainly to study how to control so-called world 
markets, we refer to players for the most part  as countries. In every period all 
producers f i s t  simultaneously choose their investment amounts, which deter- 
mine the production levels in the following periods. Afterwards the board has t o  
announce the price for the next period. In order to be believed, the board must 
always adjust its sales amounts in such a way that total supply equals total 
demand at  the prices it has chosen. 
It should be mentioned that we study the so-called closed-loop model, which 
allows the players to react to  what they have observed in the past and whch  is 
the only satisfying approach to studying the strategic interaction in time as i t  
arises in the context of running a buffer stock on an  oligopolistic market. The 
game is solved by backward induction; i.e., we first look a t  the  possible situa- 
tions in the last periods and then, by anticipating these results for the future 
periods, we determine what is done in the present period. Main emphasis is put 
on analytic discussion of how the various parameters influence the economic 
results. This is usually done by assuming symmetry of the countries 2, ..., n, 
which allows us also to study the influence of the market structure on the 
economic results. 
An extensive numerical discussion can be found in Thiemer (1981), where a 
more general version of our model with deterministic expectations for future 
demand and supply conditions is analyzed. It allows for quadratic cost functions 
and includes the effect that  past production activities may cause higher produc- 
tion costs in the future. In mathematical terminology the latter is done by 
introducing two state variables - the buffer stock and the scarcity of natural 
resources. 
After having discussed the solution of deterministic games with a finite 
number of decision periods, we will indicate how one might study games with 
infinitely many decision periods. To illustrate how one can include the stochastic 
nature of the economic relationships, we shall later consider a game which 
differs from the symmetric case of the  deterministic game only by the assump- 
tion that the marginal productivities a re  stochastic variables. Again we will dis- 
cuss the influence of economic parameters on economic results, concentrating 
on those parameters which have been used to describe the stochastic nature of 
the production process. In the final section we summarize our results and indi- 
cate possible generalizations to incorporate some additional aspects which 
might be relevant for a strategic analysis of collective buffer stocks on interna- 
tional food markets. 
2. RUNNING A BOARD 1N A DE7XRMINISI'IC M E 3 Y O R K  
2.1. Overview 
In the following we want to analyze games whose sets of players include a 
food stock agency - usually referred to as player 1 - and which assume that 
future productivity an.d demand conditi.ons are  known to all sellers. Since in 
many situations i t  is not the individual producers but rather national selling 
agencies - whose action variables are highly aggregated economic variables - 
which have to be considered. as players, this assumption might not be so 
unjustified as it is on the level of individual producers. 
We will use the following notation: capital letters refer to aggregated vari- 
ables, lower case letters to  individual variables; subindices indicate the period, 
upper indices the player or country; the vector of ind~vidual decision variables is 
usually indicated by dropping the upper index. 
l n ( 2 )  countries in the world, player 1 is the board player 
y f s O  country i's total production in period t 
Yt 2 0 world production in period t 
Xt 2 0 world demand in period t 
B, r 0 buffer stock level in period t 
st  2 0 country i's total sales amount in period t 
St 2 0 world sales amount in period t 
P t r o  world market price in period t 
c:-] r 0 cost level of country i in period t 
t = 1,. .,T periods considered by all the players 
The notation c:-~ for the cost level in period t should indicate that this vari- 
able is determined in period t - 1. The following equations follow by definition 
(summation over i with no further specification refers to summation from i = 1 
to  i = n; summation over i # j refers to  summation over i = 1 to i = n with the  
exception of i = j): 
total production in period t 
total sales in period t 
St = Xt market  clearing condition (3) 
Bt+l = Bt + Yt - St stock development equation (4) 
To complete the  underlying economic structure we assume B2 = 0 and 
5 = at - pipt a t > O ,  pt > 0 for all t (5) 
,,i = pi + aici  1 at 
t t-1 6t r 0 , 6: > 0 . zpl < for all t and j r 2 (6) 
1 
j j for j = 2, ..., n and all t St = Yt (7) 
Thus we assume that  only country 1 is able to  store the product, whereas the  
others have to sell whatever they produce. According to the  restrictions on the  
parameters, all non-board countries can always produce more by investing 
at more. The condition zpi < -eliminates only those si-tuations in which there is 
1 2 
enough supply withoui investment and stocks. Although one can also allow for 
small positive values of B2 , we assume B2 = 0 to simplify our analysis. The rea- 
son for not having B2 too large will become obvious when solving the game. 
Player 1 must. not necessarily be one of the countries in the world. For instance, 
it can  be simply the buffer stock agency, which then, of course, is unable to pro- 
duce; i.e., we must  have p: = 0 and 6: = 0 for all t .  In that  case the storage 
capacity would be used only to store some oI the other countries' prqoduction. In 
the following we will still refer to player 1 as  country 1, although our analysis will 
be general enough to include the case in which country 1 is just a buffer st;ock 
agency. To avoid situations in which storage is essentially .disposal, we impose 
furthermore 
1 < _ for j = 2, ..., n and all t 
2&+1 
i.e., marginal production costs 1/~5:+~ for countries j 2 2 are assumed to  be 
bounded from below by the price at+l/ 2/?t+1 , which maximizes total revenues in 
period t + 1. 
In every period t 2 1 the market decision process is assumed to have the 
following two stages: 
S t a g e  1 ( p r o d u c t i o n  d e c i s i o n  s t a ge ) :  
Knowing all the previous decisions - i.e., all decisions in the earlier periods 
- all countries i = 1, ..., n choose simultaneously and independently the 
amount c j  P 0 which they are going to invest in production and which deter- 
mines their output yi+l in the next period t + l  via the production 
hypothesis specified above. 
S t a g e  2 ( p r i ce  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  s t a ge ) :  
Knowing the  vector ct = [c:. . . . . of production decisions, country 1 
announces the  price pt+l which will be the valid price for all t rades within 
period t + 1. After this decision all countries are informed about pt+l . 
To complete the  description of the game model we still have to  specify the  
payoff functions for all the countries. In every period t r 1 country j = 2, ... ,n  
tries to maximize the sum of its discounted future profits; i.e., for j = 2, ..., n the 
payoff level H; of country j in period t is given by 
o r d! s 1 for all t 
where d: is the discount factor expressing country j's time preferences in period 
r . I t  should be mentioned that  the whole t e rm  - c;-l is completely deter- 
mined by the decisions in period 7-1, since the  variables p, and yi are  either 
decision variables of the  decision period 7-1 or functions of them. Thls clearly 
reveals that  the present decisions influence the future only via the buffer stock 
equation (4) and not via dynamic production functions. In the terminology of 
control theory this amounts to  saying tha t  equation (4) describes the transition 
law of the  dynamic system. Player 1's profit in period T is determined by his 
producer's revenues pq: - . which will vanish in case of p: = 0 = 6 
7 '  
and 
by his way of running the buffer stock. The profit from running the buffer stock 
is determined by the sum of the stock adjustments S; -Y2 evaluated by p, and 
the "storage costs" 
ET + P,B, + ~ $ f  C , > O I  P, < 0 (10) 
which, as we assume, are  a quadratic function of the storage level B, in period T. 
The parameter eT might include a fixed income of player 1 which results from 
given periodic transfers by all the other countries to player 1 to pay h m  for run- 
ning the buffer stock. The interpretation of (10) as "storage cost" may be 
misleading: by ,u7 < 0 we want to exclude the unrealistic event of zero stocks in 
earlier periods by imposing a kind of penalty for low stocks. So i t  is essentially 
due to #, > 0 tha t  above a certain level higher stocks induce higher "storage 
costs." Consequently in every period t P 1 player 1 tries to maximize 
where 0 S d: S 1 for all T . BTC2 is the target stock for the time after the end of 
the game (or,  in theA terminology of control theory, the transition level of the 
state variable), and pTcz (2 0) is the  parameter determining the  penalty for not 
reaching the target stock. Here i t  will be assumed that BT+Z = 2 and CTeZ = m; 
i.e., tha t  the transition stock level flT+Z has to be zero. Given BT+2 = BT+2 the  
penalty t e rm in (11) can obviously be neglected. If player 1 is just a buffer stock 
agency, we will have = 0 and 
s: = x, - c Y: 
i + l  
(12) 
because of y; = 0. 
What remains to  be specified is the number T(r1) of periods t = 1, ..., T; i.e., 
the  number of prqduction periods whch  will take place. Of course, for T = - the  
discount factor d: must always be strictly smaller than 1 (except for a finite 
number of periods) for all players j = 1, ..., n, in order to assure finite payoff lev- 
els. In the beginning it will be assumed that T is finite. Later on we will indicate 
how to handle the case T = . 
2.2. The case of finitely many periods 
The solution concept for dynamic games with finitely many periods is that  
of a subgame perfect equilibrium point (this concept was introduced by Selten 
1975; for  applications to  dynamic games see Selten 1965; Gottwald and Gueth 
1980; and Boege e t  al. 1980). Here we will not give an abstract definition of 
subgame perfect equilibrium points, nor will we try to  determine the (unique) 
subgame perfect equilibrium point of the games described. This would require 
complicated descriptions of the decision behavior in situations which cannot 
occur anyway in the case of rational decision makers. What we will do instead is 
to  compute only the  actual play, i.e., the decisions actually made according to 
the  solution. This is done by first solving the possible situations in the last 
period T. With the knowledge of what will be done in period T, the situations in 
period T - 1 actually become one-period games, as  is the case for the situations 
in period T. Continuing in the same way we can determine the decision behavior 
in all periods by backward induction. For a more detailed description of the 
computational procedure, which is often referred to as dynamic programming, 
see the  papers mentioned above. 
We derive the decision behavior by induction over t '  = T - t . First we start  
with the  decision behavior for t' = 0 . Then it will be shown how to derive the 
decision behavior for t '  + 1 under the assumption of known decision behavior for 
t '  . To compute the  behavior of the  one-period games which have to  be con- 
sidered in the  course of backward induction, one usually has t o  solve a system of 
n linear nonhomogeneous equations, which under reasonable assumptions will 
always have a unique solution. For the sake of brevity we do not investigate this 
problem in great  detail. In order to allow for an easy analytic discussion of the  
economic results, we will always discuss the symmetric case after having 
derived the  e q u a t i ~ n  system for the general case. The symmetric case here 
refers to the situation in which all countries j = 2, ..., n always have the same 
payoff function; i. e . , where we have 
6 j  = 6, (13) 
P: = P, (14) 
dt'= d, (15) 
for all periods t = 1, ..., T and for all countries j = 2 ,  ..., n. Because of the sym- 
metry of the countries j 1 2  i t  will be possible to study the  influence of the 
market  structure on the market  results simply by varying the number, n, of 
countries in the world. 
2.2.1. Decision behavior in period T 
According to the procedure of backward induction one first has to deter- 
mine the price pT+l which will be chosen by player 1 after the production deci- 
sion stage in period T. One easily derives 
Now let us investigate whether BT+l + YT+l > aT+l / 2 can ever result in the case 
of rational decision makers. First we observe tha t  because of 
aTcl/ 2pT+1 < 1 / 6i+1 for all j = 2, ..., n the board player can induce the countries 
j > 1 to  choose c$ = 0. Furthermore, player 1 can always ensure that  BTCl = 0, 
since B2 = 0 and 1 / 6:+1 > at+l / 2#3t+1 for all previous decision periods, t .  and all 
countries, j; i.e., player 1 can induce every country j > 1 t o  produce only its 
minimal amount without decreasing total revenues. Thus according to the 
actual play as determined by the solution of the game, the situation 
BT+ + YT+ > aT+ / 2 will not occur. 
For the  symmetric case i t  will be shown below that the assumption of 
/ 2 2 BT+l + YTII is - under rather mild restrictions for the parameters 
pT+l (j = 1, ..., n) - a self-fulfilling prophecy in the sense that ,  starting with 
aT+l / 2 > BT+l + YT+l, the optimal investment decisions always lead to situations 
satisfying aT+l/  2 1 BT+l + YT+l regardless of the value BT+l of the  state vari- 
able. 
Although we eliminated by our assumption the  situation 
BT+l + YTtl > aT+l/ 2. whlch induces BT+2 > 0. we would like to consider brlefly 
the case 1n which part  of the total production - namely BT+2 - is not used to 
serve demand. There are two main to exclude such situations. First of all it 
would seem to be rather unreasonable for country 1 to store more than is actu- 
ally needed and thus to increase its storage costs, although i t  foresees that the 
additional stock will never be used. That is why we believe that in our model one 
should not include situations in whch  storing activities are, a t  least partially, 
disposal. 
If it is profitable in certain periods to set aside supply which will not be used 
later on, one obviously can determine - a t  least locally - the  decisions in those 
periods without considering future effects. Tt-Lls supports our bellef that  some 
aspects of disposal activities can reasonably be investigated within the frame- 
work of static oligopoly theory, whereas pure shifts of supply between periods 
certainly require long-run consideration in a dynamic set up. 
Anticipating that  
. 
country i ( 2 2) wants to maximize 
From the necessary condition for a local maximum we derive 
Country 1 wants to maximize 
which yields accordingly 
so the n equations resulting from the necessary conditions for a local payoff 
maximum yield the following system of n linear equations in the n unknowns 
c i ;  i = 1, ..., n : 
and 
Using the notation 
the equation system can be written as 
% + l C ~  = bt+i 
It can be easily seen that det AT+! # 0 if 64+1 > 0 for j = 1. ..., n. Consequently, 
the equation system (27) has a umque solution if 6{+1 > 0. If 6Tlcl = 0 the solu- 
tion is unique, too, since then player 1 has to determine only pT+l in period T, 
since c; = 0; i.e., one has only an (n - 1) x (n - 1) matrix AT+, instead of an 
n x n  matrix. 
The symmetric case: 
We first want to show that the symmetry of the countries j = 2, ..., n implies 
that  these countries j choose the same amount c$ in equilibrium. Let us there- 
fore consider the decisions c$ and c; of two countries j, k a 2 as determined by 
the formula above: From 
k I C& - CT I = I - (pTcl + 6T+l~$) /  26T+1 + (pTC1 + 6 T + l ~ $ /  26T+1 1 (28) 
it immediately follows that one must have 
k 
ci = cT for j,k = 2 ,..., n. 
The equation system (27) can therefore be simplified to 
1 2 6 T + 1 ~ i  + (n - 1 ) 6 ~ + ~ c ;  = b;+l 
where bicl  denotes the j-th component of the vector bTcl . The unique solution 
for the symmetric case is thus 
for j = 2,. ..,n 
With the help of (32) and (33) we are now able to com.pute YT+l in order to 
check whether o u r  initial assumption 
is satisfied. We get 
Substituting (35) into (34) yields 
Assume now that Cp$+l = 0 . Condition (36) can then be expressed as 
J 
I t  is easy to  see that the right-hand side of (37) increases if n increases. Thus a 
sufficient condition for (37) can be obtained by substituting the right-hand side 
of (37) by its limit value for n -, m , which yields: 
which is always satisfied because of the restrictions on the parameters. 
Thus it has been shown that the  initial assumption (34) is justified, since it 
proves to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. The optimal investment decisions given 
the expectation that (34) holds always lead to situations satisfying (34) regard- 
less of the value BT+l of the state variable in period T and thus of the actual 
play so far. 
Discussion of the behavior in the last decision periods: 
In the  following we assume the symmetric case and that every period is 
considered as the last; i.e., that the decisi-on behavior in t prescribed by the 
solution of the game is always given by formulae (16), (32),and (33) when we sub- 
stitute t for T. Ths  assumption. cannot be simply justified by letting d$+l -+ 0 for 
all players an.d periods. 'In a last period all stock must be sold, which is not true 
for a n  earlier period even if the players themselves do not care about the future. 
Consequently, one has 
for j = 2, ..., n 
The symmetric case allows us to explore the market results for various market 
structures as indicated by the number n of countries in the world. Here we only 
investigate the case of competitive markets which results for n -r - . Since 
pt+! > 0 would imply an infinite production amount, we require pt+l = 0. One 
e as lly derives 
Bt . - 1 - 1 - B, , 
lim c: = - 
n-.- " 't+l 't+l 
"+ 1 
lim ci = 0 for j = 2, . . .  n 
n-r- 
Pt+ 1 lim Yt+l = at+] - Bt+l - -
n+- dt+l 
Thus the price in equilibrium is determined by the (constant) marginal costs 
1 / dt+l  of the non-board countries, which corresponds to our intuition about the 
economic results of competitive markets. It is perhaps surprising that the price 
level does not depend on the stock level Bt+l . The reason is that by our formula 
for pt+l we implicitly assumed 
i.e., we excluded the case in which the stock would be large enough to serve 
demand at  the equilibrium price. If  all countries are rational decision makers, 
this condition will always be satisfied, since a rational and myopic country 1 will 
always induce a zero stock level. So what one actually will observe in the case of 
n = - i s  
Thus, even in the case of an atomistic market structure country 1 will produce a 
positive amount if d:+l > ; i.e.. if it uses more effective production tech- 
nique s. 
In the same way one can analyze how changes of the parameters 
1 fltcY dtc l .  and dt+,  influence the investment amounts c: and c: as well 
j *  2 
as the resulting production amounts y:+l and y ~ + l  Since these effects are 
I >  2 
rather straightforward, we do not want to disc&< them here in detail. It is obvi- 
ous that a decrease of 6t+l - i.e., an increase of marginal costs of the non-board 
countries j 1 2 - will cause a smaller supply and that a decrease of 
(or @t+l) will diminish (or increase) total production. But it is not so easy 
to see how an increase of 6:+1 - ie., a decrease of marginal costs in country 1 - 
effects the investment amount c: in country 1. On one hand the lower marginal 
costs make it profitable in country 1 to produce more; on the other hand coun- 
try 1 has to invest less because of its greater productivity. Computing the 
derivative of 
with respect to d:+l and considering that this formula is only valid for c; 2 0 
shows that c: will be increased by an increase of 6Al if 
and that c: is diminished as soon as 6:+1 enters the range 
x 1 
2.2.2. Computation of the behavior in earlier periods by backward induction 
In the following we want to show how to compute the decision behavior in 
period t - 1 given the decision behavior in period t .  
It was proved for the last decision period T that the price pT+l and all 
investment amounts are linear functions of BT+l , the state variable of the deci- 
sion period T. Since pT+l and c; ( j  = l , . . . ,n) are linear functions of BT+l , 
because of the definition of the payoff functions Hi it follows that H$ is a qua- 
dratic function of BT+ . 
It will be shown below that for t = 1 ..... T the payoff levels H: ( j  = 1 ..... n) as 
determined by the solution of the game are quadratic functions of the stock 
level Bt+l , whch is the state variable for period t .  Since we have proved that 
this assertion is right for t' = T - T = 0 , it remains to be shown that the asser- 
tion is correct for t' + 1 = T - ( t  + 1) under the induction hypothesis that the 
assertion is valid for t' = T - t . 
3nducti.on hypothesis: 
For j = 1. .... n country j's payoff level H{ can be written as a quadratic fync- 
tion of BT+l :
j B~ for H: = u/+1 + v!+l~t+l + wt+l t+1 ( j  = l , . . . ,n) (54) 
Accordingly the payoff level H!-~ in country j can be mi t tzn  as 
for j = 2, ..., n and in case of country 1 as 
In view of 
and considering that  Yt andXt are  functions of the decision variables 
pt and c!-l ( j  = l . . . . .n) in period t - 1, one can easily see that  according to the  
induction hypothesis all payoff levels HI- are  functions of the  decision variables 
t .  1 in t - 1 and the state variable Bt of decislon period t - 1. 
Again we first have to compute which price pt is determined by country 1. 
Regarding the  fact that  
s: = at - Ptpt - (p: + 6: c:-~) 
i + 1  
(58) 
the  necessary condition for (local) maximization of by pt for given invest- 
ment decisions in t - 1 yields 
pt = Pt + RtBt + R,~:c:-, - x 61Stc:-, 
1 + 1  
(59) 
where we use the following shorthand: 
The price pt as determined by (59) must,  of course, satisfy the condition that  
Btpt 2 a, - Yt - Bt . 
De h e  
L = 1 + 26{+lw:+ 1 - atst)at 
K = - 2PtRt + 2d:+,w:+ 1 + BtRt) 
V! = LR, + 2d:+lw:+l(l - @,St) 
w!,~ = L~:s, - 2d:+1~:+1(1 - ptSt)6f 
where i # 1 ,  i # j ,  an.d for j = 2 ,..., n 
From the necessary condition for a local maximum of H{-,. j = 2, .. . . n  we derive 
CW:,~C f-, = U: + V~B, for j = 2, ..., n 
i 
(74) 
In the same way local maximization of H:-~ implies 
Altogether these equations yield the linear equation system 
Atct-1 = bt 
where 
For 6: > 0 (j = I. . . . . n) det $ will not vanish, because of the special structure 
of the matrix $ defined by (77).   or the case in which country 1 is a pure 
buffer stock agency, one again has to consider the corresponding (n -1)x(n-1) 
matrix instead of At since = 0 . Thus there will be a unique solution 
of the equation system (76). 
Since all investment amounts of the vector et-l given by (80) are linear 
functions of Bt , the same is true for pt because of (59). According to  (57) 
Bt+l is therefore a linear function of Bt . Thus not only the present profits but 
also the future payoff components of the payoff functions (55) and (56) are  qua- 
dratic functions of the state variable Bt; i.e., all payoffs ( j  = 1, ..., n) as deter- 
mined by the solution of the game are quadratic in the state variable Bt of the 
decision period t - 1, which had to be shown. According to the play as  implied by 
the solution, all countries will determine their action variables according to 
linear decision functions assigning a unique decision for every stock level, which 
is the state variable of that period. Furthermore, their payoff levels according 
to the solution are quadratic functions of the correspondi.ng state variable, i.e., 
the stock level of the next period. 
Our induction proof has two major shortcomings. First of all we assumed 
that  all decision behavior is based on local optimization. Ths  implies a restric- 
tion for the initial condition Bz ; the stock level B2 should not exceed a critical 
va1u.e. On the other hand, that is why we can compute only the play as deter- 
mined by the solution and not the solution as such. The solution as such would 
require that one also determine the decisions for situations which result 
because of former mistakes. Such mistakes might cause too high stock levels, 
which would not other-wise occur. The other shortcom.ing is that we never 
investigated the sufficient conditions for local payoff maximization. It is rather 
obvious because of our economic assumptions that these are satisfied for the 
decisions in the last period. That this is also the case for the earlier periods is 
usually proved by backward induction, which often requires lengthy arguments 
(see Boege et al. 1980). We therefore think that one should check the sacient 
conditions when actually computing the play according to the procedure 
described above, whch re quires very simple computations. When computing 
various runs for rather large values of T this was the way in which Gottwald and 
Gueth (1980) checked the sufficient conditions for local payoff maximization. 
The symmetric case 
For the symmetric case the induction hypothesis would require 
for all j = 2, ..., n. Given the symmetry of the future payoff components in the 
payoff functions (55) one can show in the same way as for the last decision 
period T that all sellers 2,  ..., n must choose the same investment amount; i.e., 
J - 
Ct-l - Ct-l for j = 2 ,..., n. The symmetry of the producers 2 ,..., n also implies 
for j = 2,. .. , n. We thus have 
pt = Pt + R,B, + R,~:C:-~ - (n  - l)dtStc,-, 
Atck1 + Btc,-1 = U, + VtB, 
c,c:-, + D,c,-I = U: + V;B, 
where A, = wLl (for j 2 2) and Ct = W& and where 8, and D, are defined accord- 
ing to  
Bt = (n - I)Ls,~, + 6,S, - 2d,+lwt+l(n - 1)6,(1 - @,st) (89) 
and 
With the help of 
E, = [B,u: - D , U ~  l det, 
I F, = [B,v: - DtVt, det, (93) 
H, = [c,v, - A,v:]/ det, (95) 
the investment decision functions for peri.od t - 1 can be written as 
Inserting (96) and (97) into (84) yields 
Pt = 1, + JtBt 
where 
I, = Pt + R,~:E, - (n  - l)dtStGt (99) 
Jt = Rt + R,~:F, - ( n  - 1)6,S,~, (100) 
Substituting the decision functions (96), (97), and (98) into the payoff functions 
(55) yields 
2 HI-, = ut + vtBt + wtBt for j = 2, ..., n (101) 
where 
In the same way one derives 
H:-~ = u: + V:B~ + W:B~ 
where 
Thus we have shown how to  derive the payoffs as functions of the state variable 
Bt for period t - 1 if these functions are known for the  next period t .  The formu- 
lae for  vt and wt as well as v: and w:, together with the decision functions (96). 
(97), and (98), yield a straightforward procedure to compute the play deter- 
mined by the  solution and the initial condition B2. One first derives by backward 
induction the decision functions 
- 
Pt+l - It+1 + Jt+lBt+l (109) 
c: = Et+1 + Ft+lBt+l (110) 
c!= %,I + Ht+lBt+~ for j = 2, ..., n (111) 
for all periods t = 1 ,..., T as  shown above. The initial value B2 , i.e. the value of 
the state variable in the  starting period 1, together with the decision functions 
P2 = I, + J,B2 (112) 
C: = E2 + F2B2 (113) 
c l  = G, + H2B2 (114) 
then determines the actual decisions c:. c l  (= c( for j = 2.. . . .  n) and pz in 
period 1 and thus the stock level B3 , which is the state variable for the next 
period 2. One therefore can proceed in period 2 as in period 1 and so forth until 
one has determined the actual decisions c:, cT = (c i  for j = 2,....n) and p,+, 
for the last decision period T. 
Besides the fact that the non-board countries 2, ..., n will not have identical 
decision and payoff functions, one can compute the play for the non-symmetric 
case according to the same procedure. There the backward induction pro- 
cedure requires, of course, the solution of T linear equation systems. 
Discussion of the solution 
Although computation of the economic results is relatively easy for the 
symmetric case, the formulae for the decision variables will be very complex in 
general and too complicated to allow a detailed analytic investigation. In the fol- 
lowing we therefore restrict our discussion to the symmetric case with two deci- 
sion periods, i.e. T = 2. This case still captures the essential dynamic aspect of 
the game situation, since in decision period 1, called the present, country 1 has 
to decide whether it wants to build up a positive stock B3 in order to shift sup- 
ply from the present to the next period T = 2, called the future. To simplify the 
formulae we assume p: = pt = 0 for t = 2,3; i.e.. production amounts are always 
zero if there is no investment. To make possible a more interesting discussion, 
we allow the initial state variable Bt+l to be positive, although we still exclude 
those cases where Bt+l is so large that BTcP would be positive according to the 
solution. 
From the equation for pTI1 and c: and C; we derive 
This shows that (again under the implicit assumption that BT+, + YTcl < a/ 2 . 
which will be always satisfied if the players are rational) the prlce determined in 
the last decision period T depends only on the parameters aT+l and @T+l of the 
demand function, on the productivity coefficients, and on the market structure 
as indicated by the number n of countries in the world. As a consequence we 
have 
@ T + 1  B T + l  aT+l - 2-+ - 
d ~ +  1 q+ 1 for j = 2, ..., n (n + l)bT+l 
and thus 
v ~ + l  = w ~ + l  = 0 
For country 1 we get 
I - H T f = ~ ~ + i a ~ + ~ - B ~ + i ~ ~ + l  
and thus 
Since only the future payoffs have to be discounted, we can neglect the time 
dependency of the discount factors, which therefore will be written as dl and d, 
respectively. The decision variables of the present period 1 will be denoted by t ,  
whereas those of the future period 2 have been denoted by T. By applying the 
recursive formulae we get 
which completely determines the decisions c:, c: ( j  = 2....,n) and pi+, in the 
present period t = T - 1 = 1 according to 
- 
Pt+l - It+,  + Jt+lB?+l 
c: = Et+1 + Ft+lBt+l 
C! = Gt+l + Ht+lBt+l for j = 2, ..., n 
Since the explicit formulae for the decision functions P , + ~ ,  c:, and cl are still 
too complex, our discussion of how some important economic parameters 
influence the present decision behavior will proceed by our f i s t  investigating 
their influence on the terms used to define the coefficients of the decision func- 
tions in t and then on the decision functions themselves. 
The discount factor d of the non-board countries 
The f i s t  interesting fact to observe is that, because wT+, = 0 and thus 
dT+,wTtl = 0, the discount factor, d. of the non-board countries does not affect 
the declsion behavior in the present period at all. Although the non-board coun- 
tries cannot store supply, this is not an obvious consequence (Gottwald and 
Gueth 1980, have examined a dynamic game in which the discount factor of oil 
traders strongly influences the decision behavior, although the traders were not 
able to store oil). One can imagine that the non-board countries could influence 
the stock level simply by changing their investment amounts, to which country 1 
will possibly react. The fact that the discount factor d has no impact on the 
decision behavior might be due to the specific information conditions prevailing 
in our model (country 1 knows the production amounts of the non-board coun- 
tries when determining the price). This indicates that a slight change in the 
model structure might strongly affect the economic results. 
Influence of the number n 
It can be seen that only BT and DT - and, of course, those coefficients 
depending on them - are influenced by the number n of producers. Further- 
more, one can see that the coefficients of the decision functions depend only via 
the ratio ( n  - l ) / n  on the number of producers. This shows that the decision 
functions converge rather rapidly to the decision functions of the competitive 
situation. 
The productivity of the pure producer countries 
Besides the effect on UT we can observe that an increase of 6T has essen- 
tially the same consequences as an increase of n ( BT and DT d.epend on n and 6T 
only via ndT or (n - We thus contine ourselves to the question of how 6T 
influences the results via UT. Since UT is increased by a decrease of dT(>O) , the 
coefficient ET is negatively and the coefficient GT posi.tively influenced by this 
effect on UT . For a given value of the stock level BT the effect on c;-, is thus 
negative and the effect on cT-l positive. In spite of the positive effect on cT-l, 
the production amount of the countries 2, ..., n will generally decrease because of 
their reduced marginal productivity. 
Influence of the storage cost parameters 
It should first be indicated that the storage cost parameter E ~ + ~  does not 
affect the decision behavior a t  all. Furthermore, h+l and .$T+I can influence the 
decisions only if d1 > 0 . If tTI1 tends to zero, the same will be true for 
RT, V; and VT. Ths implies that FT, HT, and JT also converge to zero. Thus for 
smaller values of .$T+l the present decision behavior becomes less dependent on 
the level BT of the state variable. It should be mentioned that the case .$T+l = 0 
cannot be analyzed by letting CTcl approach zero, since 1 ETl will converge to 
infinity. This indicates that the solution for CTcl = 0 probably does not rely on 
local payoff maximization. The storage cost parameter pT+l influences only the 
terms U; and UT and thus only the constants ET, GT, and IT of the respective 
decision functions. Consequently, a change of pT+l will influence the decisions 
but not the reactivity of the decisions with respect to changes of the state vari- 
able. Since PT is decreased by an increase of pT+l , the coefficient UT is greater 
if pT+l is greater. For U$ this result is not so clear, since the effect via PT will be 
a t  least partially compensated by a direct effect of pT+l . Thus it seems reason- 
able to expect a negative effect on ET , whereas the effects on GT and IT are 
more difficult to estimate. In general one would expect a reduction of present 
production YT and of BT+ . 
Country 1 as a pure bufTer stock agency 
In the case of 6; = 0 one clearly must have ci-l = 0 , which also can be 
derived with the help of our formulae. In case 6; = 0 we cannot rely on our for- 
mulae to discuss the present decision behavior. The reason is that 6; = 0 
implies 
and therefore a situation in which the present decision functions are not well 
defined. That is why one has to go to the original system of equations (87) with 
c i  = 0, which yields 
and 
If we want to use the values for UT, VT, BT, PT, RT, and ST as listed above, we have 
to assume that 6;+, is positive. Thus the present decision functions for the case 
of 6; = 0 and 6;+, > 0 are 
If we now approximate the situation of an extremely myopic buffer stock agency 
by dl -. 0 . we get RT -, 0, and thus the present decision behavior becomes less 
dependent on the stock level BT (again it is implicitly assumed that BT is not too 
large). The price will be 
r 1 
and the  investment amount 
If one wants to investigate the case in which pla er  1 is a pure buffer stock Y agency in the  present and in the future - i.e., 6T = = 0 - one has to  go 
even further back in order to derive the decision functions for this case. Since 
= 0 implies 
we no longer have the result that  the coefficients v ~ + ~  and w ~ + ~  are equal to  
zero; i .e. ,  the  pure producer countries will now take lnto account the future 
effects of their present supply decisions. This indicates that  the opposite result 
for 6:+! > 0 was due to  the fact that  the pure producers expect player 1 to  
adjust hls supply amount in order to achieve the right relation between present 
and future supply. If t h s  is impossible for player 1, the pure producer countries 
themselves have to consider the future effects. Again the time structure of the  
decision process is probably essential to an  explanation of the  different results 
for 6;+1 > 0 and 6i+1 = 0, especially that  player 1 can adjust the price to the  
production amounts previously determined. 
Computation of the actual play for the symmetric case 
In order to compute the actual play for tiie symmetric case, one has to 
know V J + ~  and w & + ~  ( j  = l,...,n) - see equations (llB), (120), and (121) - as 
well a s  the  formulae which enable us to derive vi and wj with the  help of the  
coefficients v;+~ and w:+~ of the  next period - see equations (104), (105), and 
(lo?), (108). Defining 
- 
1 
HT+1 - - - 
63+1 
- 
I T + l  - PT+I 
all decision functions can be expressed by 
- 
Pt+l - It+1 + Jt+IBt+l (152) 
for j = 2, ..., n and t = 1, ... T. Starting with B2 one can first compute the actual 
decisions for t = 1 and then for t = 2, etc., where Bt+l is determined by Bt 
according to 
It has been mentioned above that it will be easy to check the sufficient con- 
ditions for local payoff maximization when computing the actual play for numer- 
ical examples. It is easy to see that for the last decisions these conditions are 
always satisfied. So what actually has to be checked in the process of backward 
induction is whether 
It has already been indicated that the case of a pure buffer stock agency 
cannot simply be investigated by setting 6: = 0 for all periods t. Due to 
and 
one has the following initial conditions 
Given these initial conditions one can easily compute the decisions in the 
earlier periods by using just equation (88) to determine ct. 
2.3. How to study the infinite game? 
In case of T = - (we will simply speak of the infinite game) there is no last 
period T whch  can serve as the starting period for solving the game recursively. 
This already indicates that  the games with T=- are strategically very different 
from those with a f h t e  number of decision periods. As a matter  of fact,  the  set  
of equilibrium points usually explodes when switching from T < - to  T = -. In 
the literature this is usually illustrated with the help of the repeated prisoners' 
dilemma game. 
In order to define a game with T = - , one would first have to deline the 
parameters a,. 62, df ( i =  l.....n) for all the  infinitely many decision 
periods t, which indicates that  there is no unique game for the case of T = -. 
Instead of giving an  infinite list of parameter vectors, one usually will assume a 
certain trend for every one of these parameters, which should be bounded in 
order to assure finite payoffs in combination with the discount factors d i  , which 
should always be strictly smaller than 1 except for a finite number of periods. 
Once a trend has been specified for every parameter - which will always be 
assumed in this section - a game is uniquely delined just by the number T of 
decision periods', and accordingly there is a unique game for the case T = - . 
One way to determine the  solution of the infinite game would be to  look a t  
the limit of the solutions of the finite games for T -+ m ; i .e. ,  one would f i s t  t ry  to 
prove that  the limit exists and then show that  it is an  equilibrium point of the 
game with T = - . The solution of the infinite game thus derived. could be called 
the asymptotically convergent equilibrium solution of the infinite game. We 
believe that  the asymptotically convergent equilibrium solution is the most rea- 
sonable concept to approach the infinite game, since the infinite game as such is 
only understandable a s  the limit of the finite games. Here we will not specify 
certain trends for the parameters nor will we investigate the asymptotically con- 
vergent equilibri-urn solution; for examples see Selten (1965) and Boege e t  al. 
(1980). 
According to another approach one has to consider the infinite game as 
such and not as a limit of finite games. In this case one would probably specify a 
set  of axioms - possibly related to our solution concept for finite games but 
altogether somewhat stronger - which uniquely determine the decision behavior 
in the given game situation. Possible axioms would be, for instance, the equili- 
brium property and subgame consistency in the sense tha t  the decision 
behavior must be the same in two periods t and t' if Bt+l = Bt,+l , since those 
games can be considered as  strategically equivalent (see Selten and Gueth 
1978). 
4. INCLUDING STOCIMSTIC PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
The deterministic game model assumes that  every player knows exactly 
how the economic variables react  to the  decisions of the vari-ous players. In 
other words, there is no other uncertainty involved but  the one about what one's 
opponents are going to do. As was indicated a t  th.e beg]-nning, buffer stocks are 
often used on markets whose products have a rather inelastic demand e1asticit.y 
a t  given prices. Since these a re  mostly agricultural products and since the out- 
put of agricultural production processes is strongly influenced by events like 
rain, storms, etc. ,  and their respective distribution in tirne, it seems very impor- 
tant to show how the analysis of managing a buffer stock. can be extended to sto- 
chastic economic re1at.ionsh.i~~. In doing so we want to stay as  much as  possib1.e 
within the economic framework underlying the deterministic game model. For 
the sake of simplicity we will investigate only the symmetric case. 
Consider the symmetric case of the deterministic game model. Most typi- 
cally it will be the production functions 
for j = 2, ..., n 
and 
which are stochastic in nature. Of course, total demand might also be a stochas- 
tic variable, but at least for agricultural products highly aggregated demand lev- 
els seem to be more predictable than the results of the production process. 
Withn the framework of linear production functions the uncertainty might 
be due to stochastically determined parameters pl and to stochastically deter- 
mined productivity coefficients 6f (i = l . . . . .n) . Here we will assume that pf = 0 
for all i and t and that both the productivity coefficient 6: and the productivity 
coefficient at (which is the same for all countries 2,...n), are stochastic variables 
whose actual values are determined according to the uniform distribution over 
the interval [al,bl] and [a,b], respectively, where 
Since the productive effect of investment in agricultural production is uncer- 
tain, we have to specify how this affects the problem of determining the stock 
level. It was our idea that the board determines a price and is willing to adjust 
its sales amount in such a way that  demand a t  the chosen price is equal to sup- 
ply. This was essential since, in order to  be believed, the buffer stock agency 
must be willing to enforce the price which it had previously chosen. In the sto- 
chastic framework the problem of choosing a price which can be believed by all 
agents bec.omes more complicated. Consider the situation of given investment 
amounts c:-~, j = 1, ..., n. The board, i.e. player 1, has to decide about the price 
pt whch determines demand X, = at - Ptpt in period t .  If everyone were to  trust 
that this price pt will actually be the prevailing price in period t ,  one obviously 
would have 
i.e., country 1 can choose only a price p,(>O) whi.ch satisfies 
Given this restriction for the set  of possible prices for all periods t=2,  ..., T+1, we 
can proceed to solve the dynamic stochastic game with T < m as for the finite 
deterministic game. It should be mentioned that the payoffs for the stochastic 
games are uniquely defined because of their unique definition for all actual 
economic developments and because we specified the probability distributions 
according to whch the stochastic variables 6: and 6, (t  = 2, . . . ,  T + 1) are deter- 
mined. 
Decision behavior in period T 
In the last decision period player 1 will obviously choose 
a'+1 tor 1- 2 @ ~ +  1 
It should be mentioned that this price setting behavior relies on the expectation 
of minimal productivity coefficients, which implies that the restriction for the 
set of possible prices pT+l is satisfied. Thus the only difference from the stra- 
tegic choice of investment amounts in the last period T consists of the fact that 
the linear decision function (172) is defined by other coefficients than in the 
deterministic case. It will be shown below that we can restrict our attention to 
the price decision function 
Let E denote the expectation operator. Country i = 2, ..., n wants to maximize 
A s  for the deterministic case, one can show that in a subgame perfect equili- 
brium point one must have 
2 @ ~ +  1 aT+l - BT+l - alcl - 
c+ = a +  for j = 2, ..., n 
na 
From th.e local maximization of country 1's expected payoff 
we derive 
The two equations for c i  and c$ ( j  2 2  ) imply 
1 
c; = 2b:+~ - b ~ + l  for j = 2, ..., n 
a + b  + 3 a - b  
n- 2 2 
where 
The minimal production in period T+ 1 is thus 
"T+ 1 The condition that -2 > ST+] + alc: + (n - 1)ac; is therefore equivalent to 
The right hand side of (183) increases if n is increased. Furthermore, it con- 
verges to ( a  + b) / 4 for n -, .. . Because of (169) it is justified to use the price 
decision function (173) instead of (172). It is important to observe that condi- 
tion (183) does not depend at  all on the value of the state variable BT+l . Thus, 
whether condition (183) is satisfied or not is not determined by the actual play 
so far but only by the parameters of the game situation. 
Discussion of the solution for the case of myopic countries 
As for the deterministic game, we would like to discuss briefly the behavior 
for d: = dt = 0 for all t a 2 where our analysis concentrates on the question of 
how the uncertainty about the result of the production process affects the 
economic development. In the case of extremely myopic players the decisions 
in all periods t r 1 are given by 
for j = 2, ..., n 
1 where b t+l  and b k1 are  given by b $+1 and b by substituting t for T. For 
n -r m we get 
i.e., the competitive price is determined by the expected marginal costs -which 
are the  inverse of the expected marginal prodilctivity - of the non-board coun- 
tries. 
The formula for the  price pt+, shows that  only the lower bound a' for coun- 
t ry  1's marginal productivity is important for the price setting behavior, 
whereas for the non-board countries both the lower bound, a ,  for the marginal 
productivity and the upper bound, b, enter the  formula. The special case in 
which there is no uncertainty about the productivity in the non-board countries, 
i.e. a = b, implies 
This indicates that  the buffer stock agency reacts t o  the  event of worst produc- 
tivity in order to exclude situations where it cannot satisfy all the demand a t  its 
chosen price. 
We now want to  investigate how the result is influenced by the range [a,b] 
for the productivity in the  non-board countries. Let us therefore consider a n  
initial s tate a0 I b0 in which the parameters a and b are changed according to 
which obviously implies a + b = a0 + b0 . Increasing k obviously means increas- 
ing the variance of productivity in the non-board countries, whereas expected 
productivity stays constant. We get 
i.e., by an increase of k both the numerator and the denominator on the right 
hand side are increased, which shows that there is no obvious answer as  t o  how 
an increase of k affects the price. The decrease of a.which is implied by a h g h e r  
value of k forces country 1 either to increase the price or to  increase its invest- 
ment amount c: . Observe that b:+, and b:+l do not depend on k. To investi- 
gate how c: depends on k one therefore can use the following expression for c: 
The denominator in t h s  formula for c: decreases if k increases. Thus, a 
sufficient condition to assure that c: increases with k is given by 
Since - + 1 for n + m, condition (193) will be satisfied according to (185) 
n - 1  
when n is large and c: 2 0 for j 2 2. This shows that c: will increase with k for 
large values of n whenever the solution determined above will satisfy the non- 
negativity assumption that c: r 0 for j = 2, ..., n . 
One should mention that instead of studying the real game situation in 
which the investment amounts c: (i = 1. ..., n) must be non-negative, we have stu- 
died the so-called pseudogame which results by neglecting these non-negativity 
assumptions. Our approach here is to study only the pseudogame whose solu- 
tion will generally satisfy the non-negativity assumptions and thus coincide with 
the solution of the game in which the investment amounts must be non-negative. 
Since according to our assumptions country 1 has to set the price pt+l in 
such a way that it can satisfy demand even in the case of worst productivity in 
all countries, the expected value E(Bt+2) of stock in period t + 2, which is the 
state variable for decision period t + 1, must satisfy 
- 
b1 - a' + ( n  - I) b - a  2 2 Ct 2 Ct 
i.e., for given investment amounts the expected stock level E(Bt+2) is a positive 
linear function of the distances between greatest and lowest marginal produc- 
tivity in the various countries. Now for a t /  at > b1 > a' and a t /  at > b > a and 
Bt+l not too large c: and c: are positive. Thus inequality (194) implies that, 
contrary to the determ.inistic case, the buffer stock level is positive with proba- 
bility 1 even if the (expected) productivity in the future periods is worse than in 
the present period. 
Computation of the decision behavior in earlier periods 
For the last decision period T it was shown that the investment amounts 
1 ' cT, ci ( j  = 2,.. .,n) and the price pT+l are linear functions of BT+l . Accordingly, 
the expected payoffs E(H$) ( j  = I n )  are quadratic functions of BT+l which. 
furthermore, are identical for all players j = 2, . . . ,  n. One can therefore formulate 
the induction hyp0th.esi.s in a manner similar to that  of the deterministic case: 
For j = 1, ..., n player j's expected payoff E(H$ can be written as a quadratic func- 
tion of Bt+l where 
and 
The expected payoff levels E ( H ~ - ~ )  can thus be written as 
1 E(H:-,) = E(P,~:) - ct-l - Et - &Bt - C,B? + 
E(d:+lu:+l + d:+lv:+lBt+l + d:*l~:+I~:+l) 
and 
B' ) (198) E(H!-,) = E(P,Y!) - c:-1 + E ( d t + l ~ t + l  + dt+lvt+lBt+l + dt+lwt+l t+l 
for j = 2, ... , n  where 
E(Bt+,) = Bt + E(Yt) - Xt ( 199) 
If one can always rely on local payoff maximization, it is possible to show 
that  this induction hypothesis implies that  the decisions pt, c: and c: ( j  = 2.....n) 
are  linear functions of Bt which, furthermore, are  identical for all players 
j = 2 ...., n. As a consequence all expected payoffs E(H!-~) for j = 1 ...., n will be 
quadratic functions of Bt which are also identical for all players j = 2, ..., n.  
Let pt* denote the price which locally maximizes player 1's expected payoff 
as determined by (197). The price setting of player 1 is determined by 
pt as long as 
Now one cannot ignore the  event of stock levels Bt with 
because of the stochastic nature of productivity. Thus to make sure that ine- 
quality (200) is generally satisfied, one will usually need much stronger assump- 
tions than for the deterministic case, where one also had to assure that the local 
payoff-maximizing price pt determined by (59) is in the range of 
If the local payoff-maximizing price p; does not satisfy restriction (ZOO), the  
price will be given by the right-hand side of (200) and thus also be a linear func- 
tion of of the stock level Bt . In general the price setting behavior of player 1 
will thus be determined by an only piecewise linear function of Bt . We do not 
want to describe here how to determine the  decision behavior if this is the case. 
In many cases one will have to face some conceptual problems in determining 
which of the linear functions describing the  decision behavior has to be applied 
in each of the previous periods. These problems result since there is usually no 
unique self-fulfilling prophecy in that  respect and therefore no unique play 
implied by our solution requirements applied so far (see Gottwald and Gueth 
1980, and Boege et  al. 1980, where such situations have been studied. 
Obviously there are  many ways in w h c h  one can design dynamic game 
models with a buffer stock to shift present supply to future periods. One could 
use prices or production levels instead of investment amounts as strategic vari- 
ables. If production amounts are  the strategic parameters, it is - a t  least for 
the deterministic games - easy to  have quadratic cost functions instead of 
linear ones (see Thiemer 1981). 
Of course, it is also possible to  design game models with more than one 
buffer stock. In this case the state space would be multi-dimensional instead of 
one-dimensional. T h s  would imply more complicated decision formulae in the 
sense tha t  now all buffer stock levels enter into the decisions. But in spite of 
tha t  their general mathematical structure, in which the decisions are at  most 
linear functions of all s tate variables, will still be valid if we otherwise stay within 
our economic framework. 
That only one buffer stock is used to store supply will often be due to  the 
fact that  a group of producers agreed to found a buffer stock agency or 
somehow accepted that  one of them take over the role of such an  agency in 
addition to  being a producer himself. If this is t rue,  one might want to explain 
how such a n  agreement can result from independent decisions of many pr0du.c- 
ers  or how it can happen that  one producer takes over the position of a buffer 
stock agency. To do this one can include a time period t = 0 where it is decided 
by a non-cooperative bargaining procedure whether a buffer stock agency is to 
be founded or not or whether one of the  producers - and which one of them - 
should take over the role of such an  agency. 
Another special feature of our game model is that  the  number of producers 
on the market  is considered as given. The reason for this was tha t  we had in 
mind rather well-established world markets in which the number of producers 
will be determined by the number of countries. Nevertheless it might be that 
some of the countries have not started production of the  specific commo&ty but 
are  considering whether they should engage on that  market a t  the present time. 
To determine the group of actual producers on the market  endogenously, one 
might include a market entry/exit stage (before the production decision stage) 
in which all potential producers can independently determine whether they want 
to  enter  or leave that market  or not. Here one should, of course, impose market 
entry and/or market  exit costs whch  the players have to  face. 
If the buffer stock agency results from the cooperative efforts of many pro- 
ducers (i.e., player 1 is a pure buffer stock agency), the  profits of player 1 have 
to  be distributed among those producers. Consider, for instance, the case in 
which the cooperating producers have agreed on a vector of shares specifying 
the  proportion of player 1's profit that goes to  any of them. When making his 
investment decision a player j(22), engaged in the foundation of the buffer stock 
agency, will now consider not only how his decision affects his own future profits 
but  also the  payments to him by player 1. 0u.r assumption that player 1 is sup- 
posed to  maximize H: might be justified in such a case by requiring an indepen- 
dent buffer stock management whose salary is determined according to a 
strictly positive function of H: . 
This shows that our analysis can be considered only as a starting point for 
studying the economic institution of cooperative buffer stocks in dynamic sys- 
tems.  Once one gives up the  idea of total cooperation, various possibilities of 
partial cooperation arise which do not require the countries to give up all their 
independence. With respect to cooperative buffer stocks, one can especial.1~ 
vary the degree of control which the  member' countries have on the decision 
behavior of the buffer stock agency. Here i t  was assumed that  the agency is 
completely independent once it has been founded and that  it is interested in 
increasing its revenues. In the case of a producing buffer stock agen.cy this is, 
of course, limited by the fact that  revenues from production have to  be taken 
into account as well. The reason for introducing an independent agency is that 
usually an economic institution will develop its own intentions after its 
establishment. Since this will usually require financial resources, a major 
motivation will be to earn more. 
It is an interesting and important result of our analysis that in the case of a 
producing buffer stock agency the pure producers do not have to consider the 
effects their present decisions have for the future via the transition law (4). 
Whereas a non-producing agency only takes over the responsibility of balancing 
prices and supply in time, a producing buffer stock agency enables the pure pro- 
ducers to neglect future effects entirely. 
The model structure as it was introduced in section 2.1 defines only a class 
of noncooperative dynamic games. To select a game out of this class, one has to 
specify the number of countries, the parameters determining the payoff func- 
tion of each country, and the aggregate demand function, as well as the initial 
stock level. An attempt has been made to study in great detail how the market 
results will be influenced if one of these parameters defining a specific game in 
the class of games is varied. Thus we have learned how the market reacts to 
changes in the market structure, productivity coefficients, time preferences, 
demand parameters, etc. There is reason to expect that the sensitivity of the 
market process to changes in the parameters will be similar for other classes of 
games by which the workings of cooperative buffer stocks can be investigated. 
Therefore, in spite of the specific assumptions about the market decision pro- 
cess, our model should provide some general insights into how sensitive oligopo- 
listic world markets with fluctuating supply in time are to are to changes in 
these variables. 
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